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ABSTRACT 
Timothy Williamson offers the ordinary practice, the lottery and the Moorean argument for the 
‘knowledge account’ that assertion is the only speech-act that is governed by the single rule that 
one must know its content. I show that these fail to support it and that the emptiness of the 
knowledge account renders mysterious why breaking the knowledge rule should be a source of 
criticism. I argue that focussing exclusively on the sincerity of the speech-act of letting one know 
engenders a category mistake about the nature of constraints on assertion. After giving an 
analysis of assertion I propose that the norm of a type of assertion is the epistemic state one 
needs for one’s speech-act to succeed in being an assertion of that type and that the epistemic 
state in question is determined by the point of the type of assertion. One is practically irrational 
in violating the norm. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Assertion and Its Many Norms 
 
Timothy Williamson offers the ordinary practice, the lottery and the Moorean 
argument for the ‘knowledge account’ that assertion is the only speech-act that 
is governed by the single ‘knowledge rule’ or norm, that one must know its 
content. I show that the emptiness of the knowledge account renders 
mysterious why breaking the knowledge rule should be a source of criticism. I 
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then argue that focussing exclusively on the sincerity of the speech-act of letting 
one know engenders a category mistake about the nature of constraints on 
assertion. For Williamson and those in his tradition, assertion falls under purely 
epistemic norms. But assertion is an epistemic action and is governed by norms 
of epistemic action. The action of informing someone is an epistemic action. So 
is proclaiming one’s faith, answering an examiner or lying. I propose that norm 
of a type of assertion is the epistemic state one needs for one’s speech-act to 
succeed in being an assertion of that type and that the epistemic state in 
question is determined by the point of the type of assertion. Consequently, 
much of the knowledge account is at odds with this proposal, although some of 
it is also correct if assertion is thought of narrowly as informing. Next I show 
that Williamson’s the ordinary practice argument, the lottery argument and the 
Moorean argument fail to support the knowledge account. After giving an 
analysis of assertion, I propose that the norm of a type of assertion is the 
epistemic state one needs for one’s speech-act to succeed in being an assertion 
of that type and that the epistemic state in question is determined by the point 
of the type of assertion. One is practically irrational in violating the norm. 
 
 
1. Williamson’s Knowledge Account 
 
Williamson (2000) tells us that assertion is the only speech-act that is 
governed by the single rule that one must know its content (2000, 240–241). In 
this sense the rule is ‘constitutive’ of the speech-act of assertion (2000, 239, 
240–266). This rule is akin to the rule of a game (2000, 239). Breaking it does 
not result in the failure to make an assertion, (2000, 239) but makes one subject 
to criticism (2000, 240). One may think of the rule as a norm (2000, 238) or as 
giving the condition on which a speaker has the authority to make an assertion 
(2000, 257). 
Williamson tells us that in articulating the knowledge rule we describe our 
normal practice of assertion (2000, 253) and doing so is like articulating for the 
first time the rules of a traditional game (2000, 239). Ordinary speakers are 
implicitly sensitive to the rule, for they must have grasped it in mastering 
assertion (2000, 243).  
The knowledge account may be summarized in the slogan ‘Only knowledge 
warrants assertion’ where ‘warranted’ is a term of art that does not mean 
‘reasonable’ (2000, 243) but simply means that the assertion complies with the 
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knowledge rule. (2000, 255) Thus one may have excellent evidence for an 
unwarranted assertion (2000, 254).  
A weaker version of the knowledge account (earlier defended by Peter 
Unger 1975, 253-270 and Michael Slote 1979, 185 and maintained by Keith 
DeRose 2002, 179), is that to assert that p is to represent oneself as knowing 
that p. Call this the ‘representation account’. Williamson (2000, 252, n 6) argues 
that this is subsumed by his knowledge account, since in doing anything for 
which authority is required, one represents oneself as having the authority to do 
it and to have the authority to assert that p is to know that p. 
Williamson offers three arguments for the knowledge account, namely the 
ordinary practice argument, the lottery argument and the Moorean argument. First I 
turn to the emptiness of the knowledge account and the category mistake that 
this engenders, namely misconceiving of assertion as falling under purely 
epistemic norms. 
 
 
2. The Emptiness of the Knowledge Account: What’s Wrong with 
Breaking the Rule? 
 
Williamson says more about what the norm of assertion isn’t than what it is. 
He tells us that constitutive rules are not necessary conditions for performing 
the constituted act (2000, 240). He says nothing about what the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of the speech-act of assertion might be. He gives few 
examples of assertion, although he does observe that assertions are not verbal 
conjectures (2000, 244–245). 
Moreover, the assertions that are supposed to be held up to the knowledge 
rule are restricted to ‘flat-out’ or ‘outright unqualified’ assertion (Williamson 
2000, 246). But aren’t qualified assertions such as ‘He is, I think, a keen cyclist’ 
still assertions nonetheless? If so, then the knowledge account is incomplete. It 
doesn’t account for all assertions. 
Those who follow Williamson in discussing norms of assertion likewise give 
no account of the nature of assertion.1 I will fill this lacuna in section 9. Yet 
                                                          
1 This includes those that oppose it, such as Maitra and Weatherson 2010, Weiner, 
2005, Brown 2010, Douven 2006, Hill and Schechter 2007 Kvanvig 2009 and 2011, 
Lackey 2007 and 2008 as well as those who defend it such as Benton 2011 and 2012, 
Turri 2010b and Blauuw 2012. 
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surely we are in no position to decide what the norm of assertion is, or even if 
there is one, until we first know what assertion is supposed to be. The single 
clue Williamson gives us is his pronouncement that assertion is the ‘exterior 
analogue of judgement’ (2000, 238) and that ‘occurrently believing p stands to 
asserting p as the inner stands to the outer’ (2000, 255).  
This might lead us to think that if I judge that it is raining, then uttering to 
you the words ‘It is raining’ is the exterior analogue of my judgement and so is 
an assertion. This cannot be correct however, since I might utter these words in 
order to test a microphone or as lines in a play, in which latter case I at most 
merely depict the speech-act of assertion. Nor does assertion require utterance. 
There are non-verbal assertions. Suppose that you ask me whether the trains 
are running and I respond by nodding my head in emphatic affirmation. I have 
asserted that they are running. So in the ordinary sense of the word, asserting 
isn’t saying (contrary to Herman Cappelen 2011). Nonetheless it will be 
convenient to retain the application of the term ‘speech act’ to assertions, 
bearing in mind that the act may be non-verbal.  
More importantly, if one’s assertion is the exterior analogue of one’s 
judgement, then since there is no such thing as an insincere judgement, 
assertions are necessarily sincere. This result coheres with Williamson’s 
preoccupation with the point of assertion as informing. He seems to think of 
making an assertion as restricted to letting one know (or equivalently, 
‘informing’ one). This is why he claims that ‘We need assertion to transmit 
knowledge’ (2000, 267). For example, if you ask me the time, I may let you 
know that it is 2 pm by asserting to you ‘It is 2 pm’. Of course informing, as 
opposed to misinforming, is necessarily sincere. 
But surely we do make insincere assertions. Lies are perfectly genuine 
speech-acts of assertion. After all, according to the ordinary usage of words 
among ordinary folk, if lying is not telling, then we cannot tell lies, and telling 
must be asserting, otherwise I could not properly tell you the time. My lie to 
you that it is 2 pm, told when I believe or know that it is 3 pm, is an assertion.2 
                                                          
2 David Rosenthal claims that lies are not genuine assertions but are rather bits of play-
acting (1995, 208, n 15) and that insincere speech is ‘pretend speech’ (2010, 25). But 
then it would follow that I could refute the accusation that I have told you a lie by 
merely admitting that I was lying, for then I could not have told you anything. In 
contrast, a genuine case of pretending to speak arises when I utter nonsense that 
vaguely sounds like Russian in order to make you laugh. 
  Assertion and Its Many Norms  43 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 40, n. 4, pp. 39-76, out.-dez. 2017. 
A seminar that succeeds in teaching people to be more assertive need not make 
them more sincere. A liar pretends to inform one of a truth but it does not 
follow that he pretends to assert. Although he is not genuine (in the sense that 
he is not sincere) his lie is still a genuine assertion. Now if there is only one rule 
of assertion, namely that one must know its content, then any type of assertion 
must be governed by that rule. In particular, since lying is asserting, then in 
telling you a lie I must know that its content is true. This makes any lie a 
defective assertion quite independently of any moral criticism, for when I lie to 
you I believe that what I have told you is false. So unless I am irrational in 
having contradictory beliefs, I do not believe, nor therefore know, that the 
content of my assertion is true. Indeed I may easily know that I do not know 
that it is true.  
Moreover, mastering the speech-act of lying does not require implicitly 
grasping the rule that one knows its content. Indeed if one took this as the rule, 
then it is difficult to see how one could ever learn to lie. 
On the knowledge account, if you criticise me for breaking the knowledge 
rule in telling a lie, then you are not thereby criticising me for having attempted 
to deceive you into coming to believe a falsehood. The criticism seems rather to 
amount to the accusation that instead of telling you a lie I should have 
informed you of something instead—rather as if I should be playing a different 
game with different rules. 
Williamson and his followers would no doubt insist that insincere assertions 
are indeed defective.3 But the sense in which is so is very empty indeed on his 
account. He says nothing about the nature of the criticism to which one is 
subject in breaking the knowledge rule, which is not supposed to be moral or 
teleological and is not supposed to be incompatible with the aim of one’s 
assertion (2000, 240), or as one might put it, its point. On the knowledge 
account, defective assertions have no ‘warrant’ or ‘authority’, but Williamson 
has stipulated this to mean only that one has asserted what one does not know, 
which still leaves us in the dark about why breaking the knowledge rule is a 
source of criticism. Moreover ‘authority’ here seems to mean ‘authority to 
accept one’s testimony’. But it is part of our ordinary practice of assertion that 
we very often accept the word of a testifier while fully aware that we don’t 
                                                          
3 For example, Kvanvig claims that ‘no one is entitled to assert a claim insincerely’ 
(2009, 156). The elusive non-moral notion here is ‘entitled’. 
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know that she knows what she says and might suspect that she doesn’t know, 
on the evidence or presumption that she has good enough reasons. We might 
say for example ‘Since she said so, that’s good enough for me’.  
The only inkling Williamson provides of the nature of the criticism to which 
someone is subject in breaking the knowledge rule is that he has ‘cheated’ if he 
‘knowingly asserts a falsehood’ (2000, 238, my italics), or makes an assertion 
when he ‘knows that he lacks the requisite knowledge, even though he has a 
reasonable belief’ (2000, 259, my italics). This explanation is at best incomplete. 
Given our ordinary usage of ‘cheat’, one cheats at a game only if one breaks a 
rule while knowing that one has broken it, as Williamson appears to 
acknowledge. But if believe justifiably but mistakenly that I know that p, then I 
have not broken the knowledge rule while knowing that I have done so, and 
hence I have not cheated. Thus we are still owed an explanation of why 
breaking the rule in such cases should be a source of criticism. In any case, it 
would still need to be shown that assertion is governed only by the knowledge 
rule, and why one is a fault in breaking it. This hasn’t been shown.  
The upshot of all this is that the nature of the criticism to which one is 
subject in breaking the knowledge rule remains utterly elusive. Therefore we are 
not justified in thinking that breaking the knowledge rule is a source of 
criticism. After all, if we can’t say what the source of criticism is, why should we 
think that there is any source? 
Indeed one might be forgiven for wondering whether Williamson and those 
in his tradition are really talking of assertion at all, rather than of belief. 
Williamson maintains that ‘one’s evidence [for one’s belief] is just what one 
knows’ (2000, 251) and that there is a ‘rule that one should judge (or believe p) 
only if one knows p’ (2000, 11). It seems then that he would agree that having 
‘warranted belief’ is equivalent to knowing what one believes. But if so, then 
since one has warrant to believe that p just in case one has warrant to assert that 
p, and one has warrant to assert that p just in case one knows that p, it follows 
that an equivalent statement of the knowledge account is that one has warrant 
to believe that p just in case one knows that p, with the result that the notion of 
assertion drops out of the picture. 
The term ‘speech-act’ is apt to mislead us. Speech acts are not just acts but 
also actions, namely acts that one performs intentionally.4 Asserting is not like 
                                                          
4 One might insist that acts are always deliberate. If so, then the term ‘act’ may simply 
be substituted for what I call an action.   
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blinking in response to a gnat flying into one’s eye. Muttering ‘the trains are still 
running’ in one’s sleep isn’t asserting. Thus there is an important disanalogy 
between assertion and occurrent belief. On seeing a green leaf under ordinary 
circumstances, I cannot help believing that the leaf is green. In contrast, unless 
I am suffering from a psychological compulsion, the assertions I make are 
always those I could have decided not to make. We should admit that in 
judging the truth of a matter, there is a sense in which one is ‘deciding what to 
believe’. Peering at two trees in the distance I might wonder which is tallest, 
and then make up my mind that it is the one on the left. But we may as well say 
that my mind is made up for me. I do not to choose to believe that the tree on 
the left is tallest in the way I chose to tell you that the trains are still running.   
 
 
3. The Category Mistake of the Knowledge Account 
 
This exclusive focus on the sincerity of the speech-act of letting one know 
engenders a category mistake about the nature of epistemic constraints such as 
Williamson’s ‘warrant’ as it applies to assertion. To recognize this, we must first 
distinguish the rationality of action from that of belief. The rationality of a 
belief may be seen as that property of it, if true and not Gettierized, needed for 
it to be knowledge.5 Call this the ‘epistemic’ rationality of belief.  
In contrast, the rationality of an action may be seen as one’s acting in a way 
that an epistemically rational believer, similarly placed, would believe best 
promotes one’s interests by satisfying one’s desires and fulfilling one’s 
intentions. Call this ‘practical’ rationality. For example, going to a shop to buy 
bread in the knowledge that it is shut is irrational in this sense. So is attempting 
to cross the Sahara desert on foot without water.  
The practical rationality of one’s belief would be a matter of how well one’s 
acquisition or maintenance of it best promotes one’s interests—as would be 
judged by an epistemically rational believer, similarly placed—by satisfying 
one’s desires and fulfilling one’s intentions. When in a strange town it might be 
rational in this sense to believe that there is at least one stranger who may be 
                                                          
5 As Williamson would admit (2000, 30), this way of seeing it is consistent with his own 
view of knowledge as the most general mental factive state that is otherwise 
unanalyzable (2000, 33–48). 
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trusted, even on flimsy evidence.6 On the other side of the same coin, it might 
be practically irrational of me to believe that any decision I make will probably 
turn out badly, despite excellent inductive evidence for this, because I should 
recognize that clinging to this belief robs me of the ability to make any decision 
at all, a worse outcome than making generally bad ones. This is not the sort of 
constraint on belief germane to the Williamson tradition. 
Since assertion is an action, namely a deliberate or intentional act, it is 
subject to the constraints of practical rationally. It is governed by norms of 
action, in other words practical norms. This is entirely consistent with the fact 
the action of assertion is also epistemic, such as informing or lying. This is 
supported by one of Williamson’s rare examples of an assertion in which  
I shout ‘That is your train’, knowing that I do not know that it is, because it 
probably is and you have  only moments to catch it” (2000, 256).  
 
Williamson continues as follows. 
 
Such cases do not show that the knowledge rule is not the rule of assertion. They 
merely show that it can be overridden by other norms not specific to assertion (2000, 
256) 
 
But since assertion is governed by norms of action, there can be no such 
thing as a purely epistemic norm of assertion. Rather there are practical epistemic 
norms of assertion. Must there only be one of these, namely that one knows the 
content of one’s assertion? No, because what norms are in play will depend 
upon what one is trying to do with the assertion. One might aim to impart 
knowledge (as in teaching, informing or confessing). But one might also aim to 
report belief (as in opining), conviction (as in proclaiming faith) or knowledge 
(as in answering an examiner) to instil disbelief (as in eristic assertion) or to 
deceive one into accepting a falsehood (as in lying).7  I will return to this crucial 
point again in section 9. 
                                                          
6 In other cases the chance that the content of one’s belief is true, something that 
would benefit one, is raised by one’s acquiring or maintaining it. For example, when 
faced with a would-be mugger, my belief that he will not take my wallet might partly 
spark or sustain my successful resistance to him taking it. 
7 This is in line with an older tradition of discussion of assertion as it relates to Moore’s 
paradox (Baldwin 1990, Jones 1991 Welbourne 1992, Williams 1994) and very broadly 
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 Examples of assertions that are practically irrational might include, in the 
right circumstances, attempting to compliment someone by informing him that 
he is stupid or trying to tell him the lie that 2 + 2 = 4. This is not the sort of 
constraint that concerns post-Williamson discussants, which is for them, 
epistemic.8  
There is also a sense—but only an attenuated and derivative one—in which 
an assertion may be said to be epistemically rational. If you tell me that it will 
snow in tomorrow in Bangkok I may judge that this is a silly thing to say, but I 
do not judge it silly for the same kind of reason that I would judge it silly of you 
to try to compliment a friend by informing him that he is stupid. Rather, I 
judge you irrational insofar as I take you to have an epistemically irrational 
belief, under the assumption—which might be false—that you are sincere. This 
is the sort of epistemic constraint on assertion that concerns Williamson and 
those in his tradition. But this is a constraint upon the belief I have assumed you 
to have. The constraints of rationality upon the speech-act of assertion are not 
purely epistemic, as Williamson and his followers assume, but primarily 
practical.  
The two sorts of categories can come apart. One may be practically 
irrational in asserting that p despite the fact that one’s belief that p is 
epistemically rational. I may have excellent grounds to think that the person I 
am trying to compliment is stupid. One may also be practically rational in 
asserting that p despite the fact that one’s belief that p is epistemically irrational. 
Suppose that I have the long-standing belief that people are following me. As 
my therapist, you bring me to the recognition that my belief is epistemically 
irrational because I have no reason for it. Nonetheless I find myself unable to 
discard the belief. So I try to convince you that I still have it for no reason, by 
telling you ‘I still believe that people are following me, although I still have no 
reason to believe this’. My assertion is practically rational because it furthers the 
fulfilment of my larger intention of getting you to rid me of my belief.  
                                                                                                                                        
in the spirit of Grice (1989) in which the nature of an assertion is more fully explicated 
in terms of its overall intention or point. 
8 It is clear that Williamson’s ‘warrant’ for an assertion is an epistemic notion, being 
compliance with the knowledge rule. Likewise Kvanvig, for example, argues that ‘to the 
extent that appropriate assertion is subject to epistemic constraints, those constraints 
have to do with justification rather than knowledge’ (2009, 140). 
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Conflating the two sorts of constraint is less harmless when asserting is an 
attempt at informing, for then the speaker genuinely attempts to impart 
knowledge, and this attempt is subject to both sorts of constraints. One may 
criticise her for not having the knowledge she thinks she has or because she 
should see that her larger intention in transmitting knowledge, such as paying a 
compliment, will not succeed. But for other types of assertion it is important to 
distinguish the two sorts of constraint. In order to discuss these types, I will 
propose an analysis of assertion in section 9.  
I now turn to Williamson’s three arguments for the knowledge account, 
namely the ordinary practice argument, the lottery argument and the Moorean 
argument, showing that each fails to support the knowledge account. 
 
 
4. The Ordinary Practice Argument and its Supporters 
 
Williamson claims that our ordinary ‘linguistic practice of assertion’ (2000, 
253) confirms the knowledge account (2000, 243, 252-253). A standard 
response to one’s assertion, say that it is raining, is the question ‘How do you 
know that?’ Williamson says that this question presupposes that it has an 
answer and thus one knows (2000, 252). A more aggressive challenge is ‘You 
don’t know that’ (2000, 253). If the knowledge account were false then these 
questions would be irrelevant. 
Jonathan Kvanvig objects that in response to an assertion such as ‘It is 
raining’ it is also appropriate to give a stronger challenge to it by asking ‘Are 
you certain?’ and points out that 
 
If the conversational propriety of various questions is an argument in 
favour of the knowledge account, the propriety of these questions is an 
argument in favour of a stronger account: that one must be absolutely 
certain in order for a claim to be assertible (2009, 143, my italics). 
 
Williamson’s defence against this line of objection is that although it is 
appropriate to assert ‘p but by Descartes’s standards of certainty I cannot be 
absolutely certain that p’, ‘assertibility goes with knowledge, not the highest 
possible standards of certainty’ (2000, 254).  
John Turri (2010, 459) observes that Kvanvig may simply evade this defence 
by noting the propriety of asking ‘Are you certain?’ in terms of ordinary 
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standards of certainty. Turri instead mounts a different defence. Consider an 
official at a wedding who utters ‘I now pronounce you man and wife’. Turri 
observes that it is appropriate to ask her ‘Are you certain that you’re allowed to 
do that?’ and claims that this shows that the requisite authority to make the 
pronouncement, namely being legally licenced, is not her certainty that she is so 
authorized. By analogy, ‘Are you certain?’ is a challenge to one’s certainty that 
one has the authority to assert ‘It is raining’, not to one’s authority, namely 
compliance with the knowledge rule. Thus the propriety of ‘Are you certain?’ is 
consistent with the knowledge account (2010, 459). 
This defence fails for three reasons. Firstly, the analogy is flawed. It works 
only if it holds between different challenges to assertions, but the 
pronouncement is not an assertion but only a performative. The utterance of a 
declarative sentence is performative just in case uttering it, in the right 
circumstances, brings about a state of affairs other than just its having been 
uttered. Assertions purport to report the state of the world whereas 
performatives aim to change it. Some performatives are also assertions. If I say 
to you in the right circumstances ‘I promise that I will be punctual tomorrow’ 
then I have promised to be punctual. But it also seems correct to say that I 
have asserted that I will be punctual. I have changed the world by bringing into 
existence a promise, so my utterance is a performative. But I have also reported 
a future state of affairs of the world, consistently with my utterance being an 
assertion as well. The official’s uttering to a couple in the right circumstances ‘I 
now pronounce you man and wife’ marries the couple, so this utterance is a 
performative. But in contrast to the promise, it does not seem to report a state 
of the world. There is no need to report the existence of a marriage that has so 
conspicuously just been brought into existence. Such a report would violate 
Grice’s maxim of quantity by giving more information than is needed (Grice 
1989, 26).   
Secondly, although a legal licence is required for the pronouncement to 
authoritatively marry the couple, this does not mean that it does so 
appropriately. Not every legally licenced performance is appropriate. Having 
changed my name by deed poll to ‘Barack Obama’, it would still be 
inappropriate for me to introduce myself unqualifiedly over the phone with ‘I 
am Barack Obama’. Likewise if the official is legally licenced to marry the 
couple but is uncertain that she is so licenced (perhaps because she is suffering 
from dementia), then it would clearly be inappropriate of her to make the 
pronouncement. 
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Thirdly, even if the propriety of ‘Are you certain?’ is consistent with the 
knowledge rule, the fact remains that we still have an explanation of the 
propriety that rivals it.  
Turri then claims that the knowledge account explains the propriety. He 
argues that by ordinary standards of certainty, if one is certain that p then one 
knows that one knows that p, so to ask someone who asserts that p whether she 
is certain that p is to ask her whether she knows that she knows that p. By 
asserting that p, she represents herself as knowing that p. Thus asking her 
whether she is certain that p amounts to asking her whether she knows that she 
is accurately representing herself (2010, 459–460). 
Turri’s explanation faces a limitation and two objections. The limitation is 
that it is not an explanation of how the knowledge account explains the 
propriety of the stronger challenge, but rather an explanation of how it might 
be dealt with by the weaker representation account. The notion of 
representation does not figure in the knowledge account. Moreover Unger and 
Slote themselves say little about it, which provides no way to evaluate the claim 
that if one asserts that p then one represents oneself as knowing that p. Kvanvig 
defends this claim on behalf of Williamson as follows. Since the norms of a 
practice are presupposed by those involved in the practice, hearers expect 
speakers to know and speakers expect to be taken to know (2009, 144).9  
But lying shows that this argument proves too much. If you know that I am 
a habitual liar when I assert to you that p, then you will not expect me to know 
that p, yet surely I am still representing myself to you as knowing that p, 
otherwise I could not sensibly hope that my lie will succeed.  
Moreover, I might represent myself as knowing that it is raining by 
supposing for the sake of argument that I know this, yet no impropriety results 
if I point out in the process that I do not know that it is raining.   
Against Turri’s explanation, being certain that p does not entail that one 
knows that one knows that p. I may be as certain as reasonably possible of a 
falsehood, in which case I do not know that p, nor therefore know that I know 
that p. Secondly, asking someone whether she is certain that p is not to ask her 
whether she knows that she knows that p. Surely ‘Are you certain that the post 
office is on Carter Street?’ is a different and less complex question from the 
                                                          
9 However there appears to be no textual evidence in Williamson (2000) that this is his 
argument. 
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odd and usual ‘Do you know that you know that the post office is on Carter 
Street?’ An appropriate answer to the first, but not the second, would be ‘Yes, 
I’m pretty certain that it is, but I might be mistaken’. 
Other supporters of the knowledge account invoke additional 
conversational data. Turri observes that not only may we challenge an assertion, 
but we may also prompt someone to make one by asking, for example, ‘What 
time is it?’ or ‘Do you know what time it is?’ Turri claims that ‘these two 
prompts are practically interchangeable. Competent speakers respond to them 
identically’ (Turri 2010, 460). We may also abstain from answering a question 
by saying ‘Sorry, I don’t know’ (Turri 2015, 386).  
However we may also prompt an assertion by asking ‘What time do you 
think it is?’ and competent speakers also respond to this interchangeably with 
‘What time is it?’  We may also abstain from answering a question by saying 
‘Sorry, but I can’t say’, and one explanation of this is that we have no justified 
belief about what time it is. So the knowledge account fares no better than this 
alternative explanation of the data.  
Matthew Benton (2011) claims that parenthetical assertions such as ‘It is, I 
know, raining’ (or ‘It’s raining, I know’) are inappropriate, as explained by the 
knowledge account, because what one’s unqualified assertion that it is raining 
‘expresses one’s knowledge’ (Benton 2011, 685), with the result that the 
parenthetical ‘I know’ is redundant and thus inappropriate. 
Rachael McKinnon and John Turri (2013) give an objection to Benton. 
Suppose that you and I are playing golf when it starts raining, ‘a fact we are 
both obviously alert to’ (2013, 126). I say to you, ‘Look, it’s raining’ and you 
reply appropriately ‘It’s raining, I know’. However they think that this is not a 
decisive example against Benton because he could respond that your 
parenthetical ‘I know’  
 
… serves to indicate that my initial assertion was otiose because you 
already knew that it was raining, in which case the parenthetical is not 
redundant’ (2013, 126).  
 
This response would fail. My ‘Look, it’s raining’ might have a point if, for 
example, I intend to urge you to take action such as putting on a raincoat or 
retreating to the clubhouse. Here I remind you of the practical importance of 
what I know you already know. Thus my assertion is governed by a practical 
epistemic norm. The norm is not entirely epistemic of course, as we saw in 
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section 3. How could it be? Assertion is an action, after all, albeit an epistemic 
action. My assertion is not improper, but its propriety is not to be explained in 
terms of the knowledge rule but in light of the fact that my assertion has a point 
other than informing you that it is raining. On the other hand, if my only point is 
to inform you that it is raining, then my assertion is indeed improper, because I 
cannot sensibly hope to impart to you knowledge that I know you already have. 
But in that case the knowledge rule cannot explain the impropriety, because I 
indeed know that it is raining. 
Furthermore, there are cases in which we make parenthetical assertions to a 
hearer who does not already know its content. Suppose that tell you that Jack is 
a keen cyclist. You ask if I am sure and I reply ‘He is, I know, a keen cyclist’. 
This reply is perfectly appropriate. So the parenthetical stressed ‘I know’ is not 
redundant, contrary to Benton. 
Martijn Blauuw however takes this parenthetical stressed use of ‘I know’ as 
evidence in favour of the knowledge account. For example, in response to 
repeated accusations that I am very lazy, I might reply ‘I am, I know, very lazy!’ 
or ‘I am very lazy, I know!’ Blauuw observes that this is an appropriate assertion.  
He claims that this is because the stressed ‘I know’ reinforces the expression of 
knowledge (that I am very lazy) made by the outright assertion (‘I am very lazy’) 
in which it is embedded. Likewise there is a ‘repeated parenthetical’ use of ‘I 
know’ that is not redundant. For example, ‘I am very lazy, I know, I know!’ or 
‘I am, I know, I know, very lazy!’ also reinforces the expression of knowledge 
(that I am very lazy) made by the outright assertion (‘I am very lazy’) in which it 
is embedded. In contrast, ‘I am very lazy, I believe!’ is inappropriate because the 
parenthetical ‘I believe’ hedges the assertion in which it is embedded. It reduces 
my commitment to knowing that I am very lazy to only knowing that I believe 
that I am very lazy. But the parenthetical ‘I know’ may reinforce the assertion in 
which it is embedded by changing me from representing myself as knowing that 
I am very lazy to representing myself as knowing that I know that I am very 
lazy (2012, 107). 
I agree that the stressed or emphatic ‘I know!’ may express knowledge, as I 
will explain in section 8.  Nonetheless Blauuw’s examples are not decisive in 
favour of the knowledge account for four reasons. Firstly, like Turri (2010), he 
has defended the representation account while leaving the knowledge account 
untouched. Secondly, ‘I am, I believe, very lazy’, sounds inappropriate because 
that one is very lazy is not the sort of thing that one merely believes, rather than 
knows. In this respect the assertion is inappropriate in much the same way as ‘I 
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am, I believe, very angry’ or ‘I am, I believe, in much pain’. In contrast ‘He is, I 
believe, a keen cyclist’ is perfectly appropriate. Thirdly, it may be argued that it 
need not only be the stressed ‘I know’ that expresses knowledge. The verbal 
counterpart of the exclamation mark may do so as well, as in ‘I am very lazy!’ or 
‘He is a keen cyclist!’ I will return to this point in section 8. Lastly there is an 
alternative explanation of why ‘I am, I know, very lazy’ might be appropriate in 
way that ‘I am, I believe, very lazy’ is not. This is that I know that only 
admitting knowledge of my guilt, in other words, confessing—perhaps 
repeatedly—will satisfy my accuser and so stop the nagging. In such a case my 
response is practically rational. In contrast, consider a less demanding accuser 
who alleges that I spilt coffee on the floor last night. As my memory starts to 
clear and my hangover recede, I respond ‘Hmm … I did, I think, spill it on the 
floor’. This response might be both sincere and appropriate, especially if I 
know that she will be satisfied merely by my admission that I believe that I am 
guilty. 
Moreover, the propriety of my assertion ‘Jack is a keen cyclist, so I believe’ 
falsifies the knowledge account. There is nothing improper in my assertion that 
Jack is a keen cyclist. But my parenthetical ‘so I believe’ conversationally 
discounts my knowledge that he is a keen cyclist because, as Williamson 
acknowledges, adding this would be ‘conversationally misleading’ (2000, 42) 
were I to know that he is a keen cyclist. In that case I would violate Grice’s 
maxim of quantity by giving you less information than you need (1989, 26). 
Moreover the knowledge account predicts that because my assertion is proper, 
I know that Jack is a keen cyclist. But if so then my qualification ‘so I believe’ 
would be redundant because whatever I know, I already believe. Clearly it isn’t 
redundant.   
In sum, our ordinary practice of assertion—or in more old-fashioned terms, 
appeal to ordinary language—does not substantially support the knowledge 
account.    
 
 
5. The Lottery Argument 
 
Next consider Williamson’s lottery argument (2000, 246). You have bought 
a ticket in a lottery that I know is fair with many tickets, only one of which 
wins. The draw has been held but the result has not yet been announced. On 
the probabilistic grounds that your ticket was only one of many, but without 
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telling you my grounds, I make the unqualified assertion to you ‘Your ticket did 
not win’. Williamson claims that ‘Intuitively, [these] grounds are quite 
inadequate for that outright unqualified assertion’ (2000, 246). He continues as 
follows. 
 
You will still be entitled to feel some resentment when you later discover 
the merely probabilistic grounds for my assertion. I was representing 
myself to you as having a kind of authority to make the flat-out assertion 
which in reality I lacked. I was cheating (2000, 246, my italics) 
 
The knowledge account is supposed to explain the persistence of your 
entitlement to resentment, since I did not know that your ticket did not win. 
Thus I have no warrant for my assertion, but only for ‘It is highly probable that 
your ticket did not win’. Nonetheless Williamson admits that I do have 
excellent evidence that your ticket did not win and also excellent evidence that I 
do not know that it did not win (2000, 254).  
This position is objectionable. Firstly, it is far from clear that you were 
entitled to feel resentment when I first made my assertion. For all you knew, I 
might have known that your ticket did not win. Nor does my not telling you my 
grounds for an assertion normally entitle you to feel resentment. If you 
telephone me to ask whether it is raining in my location and all I tell you is that 
is raining, I do not entitle you to feel resentment. If you did feel resentment 
when I told you that your ticket did not win, it was probably because you 
thought it rude of me to remind you of my misfortune. If so, discovery of the 
wholly probabilistic grounds for my assertion will not mollify you. 
Secondly, let us assume for the sake of argument that I did represent myself 
to you as having a kind of authority to make the assertion that I lacked. It does 
not follow that the authority involved is, as Williamson has merely stipulated, 
my knowledge that your ticket did not win. An alternative explanation is that I 
represented myself to you as having extra, non-probabilistic evidence not 
amounting to knowledge that I lacked that would increase the justification of 
my belief that your ticket did not win by adding it to the merely probabilistic 
evidence. This might be that I have quickly scanned the results of the lottery in 
today’s newspaper and did not recognize your number, or that I have been told 
by a generally but not completely reliable testifier that someone else has won. 
Lastly, Williamson has the intuition that although my knowing only that 
your ticket was one of many is excellent evidence that it did not win, 
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nonetheless it is inadequate for my assertion. This is all that supports his lottery 
argument. But intuitions vary. My intuition is that because it is excellent 
evidence, it is indeed adequate and that there is nothing improper in my 
assertion. I know many ordinary people who use words in ordinary ways and 
who share my intuition. How do we go about adjudicating which intuition is 
decisive?   
A comparison with a different case might help. Suppose that you acquire the 
irrational fear that all the molecules of oxygen in the room will suddenly 
congregate in one corner, resulting in our suffocation. Knowing only that there 
is roughly one in a googleplex chance that this will occur, I tell you solemnly, 
‘That won’t happen’. My assertion seems quite proper. Indeed it seems 
improper of me to tell you instead ‘That’s very unlikely to happen’ because that 
would give you less reassurance than is appropriate. Instilling in you the 
conviction that it won’t happen is the point of my assertion. That I would make 
the former rather than the latter assertion seems perfectly in line with our 
ordinary practice of assertion.  
In the lottery case, someone such as myself who genuinely believes that 
probabilistic grounds are authority enough to tell you that your ticket did not 
win, has not misrepresented himself even if probabilistic grounds are not in fact 
proper authority. Such a person misrepresents herself as having proper 
authority only if she believes that she doesn’t have it. She does believe she has 
it. 
 
 
6. The Moorean Argument 
 
Williamson’s Moorean argument goes as follows (2000, 253–254).  
Something is wrong with any assertion of the form ‘p and I do not know that 
p’. The knowledge account explains this by showing that one cannot know it. 
Supposing for reductio that I do, then since knowing a conjunction involves 
knowing each conjunct, I know that p. But knowing the conjunction also 
means that both conjuncts are true, hence I don’t know that p. Thus I do and 
don’t know that p. Contradiction.10 In contrast, the hypothesis that not only 
knowledge warrants assertion makes it hard to understand why the assertion is 
improper.  
                                                          
10 Sorensen (1988) argues similarly, calling this a ‘knowledge blindspot’. 
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But some assertions of the form ‘p and I do not know that p’ are proper. 
Suppose that you ask me if the trains are running. I reply colloquially, yet 
properly  
‘They are running. But don’t quote me, I don’t know it for a fact’.  
My assertion of the first conjunct is both outright and unqualified and so is 
‘flat-out’. The propriety of my reply derives from the fact that you will 
recognize its point, which is to instil in you my belief that the trains are running 
while disclaiming knowledge, and with it the commitment that comes with 
claiming to have knowledge, should my belief turn out to be false.  
Or suppose that I have bought the lottery ticket and the draw is yet to be 
held. You say to me ‘Don’t get your hopes up!’ I nod my head to show my 
acceptance of your advice and reply earnestly yet gloomily ‘My ticket won’t 
win’, thus expressing my conviction that it won’t win. My conviction is justified 
by my knowledge that there is very little chance of it winning. However I don’t 
know that it won’t win, since there is nothing to indicate that my ticket is any 
different from all the others, one of which will win. Furthermore, I’d be silly to 
buy a ticket that I know won’t win and since I know I’m not silly in this way, I 
know that I don’t know that it won’t win. In contrast, I may sensibly buy a 
ticket in the justified conviction that it won’t win, because in so doing I am 
really purchasing the slim chance that my justified conviction may turn out to 
be false. This might be a good purchase if the cost is low and the reward high.  
Suppose that you know all this of me. You hear nothing improper in my 
non-jocular assertion ‘My ticket won’t win’. Nor will you hear impropriety if I 
tell you instead  
 
‘My ticket won’t win. I’m convinced of that. But still, one never knows’.  
 
By ‘one never knows’ I include myself of course, as you recognize. You are 
entitled to take me as both truthful and sincere. You will see the point of my 
assertion, which is to make a realistically pessimistic prediction tempered with a 
realistic degree of optimism.   
Kvanvig (2009) gives a rival explanation of the putative impropriety of all 
Moorean assertions in terms of sincerity and justification for belief. He argues 
for ‘Kvanvig’s principle’ 
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If one is justified in believing that p and one knows that one believes 
that p, then one is justified in believing that one knows that p 11 
 
as well as Kvanvig’s norm of sincerity: 
 
One should assert that p only if one believes that p 
 
and Kvanvig’s norm of justification: 
 
One should assert that p only if one is justified in believing that p. 
 
Now suppose that I assert that (p & I don’t know that p). I have asserted 
that p. Given my conformity to the norm of justification, I am justified in 
believing that p, and given my conformity to the norm of sincerity and that I 
know whether I am sincere, then I know that I believe that p. So by Kvanvig’s 
principle, I am justified in believing that I know that p. But this means that I am 
not justified in believing that I do not know that p, yet I have also asserted that I 
do not know that p and so have violated the norm of justification.12 
However, suppose that you ask me ‘Will it rain?’ I look up at the sky and 
seeing dark clouds gathering, assert ‘It will rain soon’. I know myself to be a 
very reliable predictor of rain but I also know that my evidence falls short of 
that needed for knowledge. Against Kvanvig’s principle, I know that I believe 
that it will rain soon, and I am justified in thinking that it will, but I am not 
justified in believing that I know that it will rain soon. In fact I might know that 
I don’t know this. Knowing all of this of me, it seems that I may properly tell 
you ‘It will rain soon, but I don’t know that it will’. Placing stress upon ‘know’ 
might properly indicate to you that I regard such matters as beyond our ken.  
                                                          
11 Kvanvig’s argument for this principle depends crucially on the claim that a necessary 
condition of one’s knowing that p is that one has justification for one’s belief that p that 
is ultimately undefeated (2009,145). In (Williams 2015) I argue that one should not 
accept this claim, because it prohibits one from knowing that one has a posteriori 
knowledge. 
12 Here Kvanvig assumes two other principles, that, plausibly, asserting a conjunction 
involves asserting its conjuncts, and also that if one has a pair of beliefs the contents of 
which are in overt contradiction, then one cannot be justified in having both. I defend 
both principles in (Williams 2010). 
58 John N. Williams   
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 40, n. 4, pp. 39-76, out.-dez. 2017. 
Let us make this indication more salient. Suppose that I have a particular 
view of knowledge as requiring sensitive belief. By my lights, I cannot know 
that it will rain soon, because were it not about to rain soon, I would, on the 
same basis of seeing dark clouds gathering, still believe that it will. Again 
from my perspective, I am entirely sensible in trying to secure the best 
epistemic state available short of knowledge, namely justified conviction 
that it will rain soon. Supposing that you know my epistemological views on 
this matter, if you ask me whether it will rain and I reply ‘It will rain soon, 
but I don’t know that it will’, you will hear no absurdity, even if you do not 
share my view of knowledge, one of which I remind you by placing stress 
on ‘know’. You will see the point of my assertion, which is to get you to 
accept my prediction on the strength of my justified conviction.  
Matthew Weiner (2005) gives a similar example. Captain Jack Aubrey, who 
has long experience of naval combat against the French Navy, has been 
watching French ships maneuver, together with the less experienced Lieutenant 
Pullings. At 2 pm Aubrey says to Pullings ‘The French will attack at nightfall’. 
Weiner observes that this seems to be a proper assertion, yet Aubrey’s grounds 
are not the sort that would be sufficient for knowledge. He adds that were 
Pullings to ask ‘How do you know that the French will attack at nightfall?’ 
Aubrey might properly reply 
 
I don’t know they’ll attack at nightfall—we haven’t intercepted their 
orders—but my prediction is that they will. (2005, 238) 
 
Benton (2012) makes three objections.13 His first is that if the knowledge 
rule does not apply to this case then we should expect that queries such as 
‘How do you know?’, ‘which presuppose knowledge’ (2012, 104) will clearly be 
inadmissible in response to predictions such as ‘The French will attack at 
nightfall’ and they aren’t.  
But here we should note, as Williamson acknowledges (2000, 253), that 
‘How do you know that?’ is not always intended as challenge to an assertion but 
may be a straightforward request for the reasons the speaker has for believing 
the content of her assertion. Taken that way, Pullings is asking whether Aubrey 
knows that French will attack at nightfall, by asking him, inter alia, if there is any 
                                                          
13 I will not deal with these in the order in which Benton gives them. 
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source of would-be knowledge. Thus the question is admissible, for Pullings 
has in effect asked Aubrey whether he knows that the French will attack at 
nightfall and Aubrey has properly and truthfully replied that he does not.  
 
Benton further objects that  
 
‘I don’t know they’ll attack at nightfall but my prediction is that they will’. 
 
is not akin to  
 
‘I don’t know that they’ll attack at nightfall, but they will’ 
Because 
 
… its final conjunct, prefaced as it is with ‘my prediction is that’ seems 
to back off” from the original outright ‘The French will attack at 
nightfall’. (20012: 104).  
 
But there is no backing off. In telling Pullings ‘The French will attack at 
nightfall’, Aubrey is already making a prediction, as Pullings well knows. So the 
prefaced ‘my prediction is that’ reiterates the prediction.   
It might be replied that if one asserts ‘They’ll attack’, then one predicts that 
they’ll attack but if one asserts ‘I predict that they’ll attack’, then one asserts that 
one predicts that they’ll attack. This is perfectly true, but by asserting that one 
predicts that they’ll attack, one also predicts that they’ll attack. This is consistent 
with Williamson’s observation (2000, 259) that by asserting that one asserts that 
p (as in ‘I’m telling you that they’ll attack’), one asserts that p, (as in ‘They’ll 
attack’). This is why, if Aubrey tells Pullings ‘They’ll attack’ and Pullings asks 
‘Are you sure?’ Aubrey may properly reply ‘They’ll attack, I tell you’. His ‘I tell 
you’ reiterates and thus reinforces his prediction. 
Benton’s final objection is merely that ‘I don’t know that they’ll attack at 
nightfall, but they will’ ‘sounds quite bad’ (2012, 103). In effect, we have already 
dealt with this point, because Benton neglects to follow Weiner in italicizing 
‘know’. Aubrey’s stress on ‘know’ may play a crucial role. Suppose that instead 
of mentioning the interception of orders, Aubrey has already explained to 
Pullings that although he has undisputed know-how in reading French 
maneuvers with great predictive success, the future just isn’t the kind of thing 
we may know. He might have claimed that that the future is unsettled in a way 
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the past isn’t or that there are no truths about the future or that only God may 
know what the future will bring. The following conversation might ensue. 
 
Aubrey:  The French will attack at nightfall. 
 
Pullings: How do you know? 
 
Aubrey:  I don’t know that they’ll attack at nightfall, but they will. 
 
Aubrey’s stress on ‘know’ is his reminder to Pullings that by his lights, 
knowledge of a future attack has already been ruled out, with the result 
that the attempt to obtain it is inappropriate. Even if Pullings disagrees 
with Aubrey’s view of the future, still he cannot appropriately look to 
Aubrey for knowledge, but as a practical lad in a dire situation should be 
prepared to settle for something less, like Aubrey’s word (as in his ‘I tell 
you’) or his justified conviction. Thus instead of the conversation above, 
it would also be appropriate of Aubrey to remark    
 
‘The French will attack at nightfall. Of course that isn’t the sort of thing 
one may know. But still I’m convinced that they’ll attack’. 
 
In both cases Pullings (and you, the reader) will see the point of Aubrey’s 
assertion, which is to instil belief or conviction in Pullings that the French will 
attack at nightfall.   
It is not only predictions that may be properly conjoined with a denial of 
knowledge.  Suppose that I wish to join a fideistic religious order that holds 
that the existence of God is an article of faith, His existence being unknowable. 
To show that I am eligible to join, I assert to the relevant patriarch 
 
‘God exists. My faith in that is unshakable, but of course the existence of 
God isn’t the sort of thing one may know’.  
 
The patriarch will hear nothing improper, especially if he follows Luther in 
holding that knowledge of God’s existence would exclude faith in it.14 
                                                          
14 ‘All the articles of our Christian faith, which God has revealed to us in His Word, are 
in presence of reason sheerly impossible, absurd, and false’ (Luther, Werke viii). We 
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Knowing all this, you will not detect impropriety either, since whatever your 
religious beliefs, you will recognize the point of my assertion, which is to affirm 
my allegiance to the doctrine by my proclamation of faith. 
 
 
7. The Impropriety of Some Moorean Assertions  
 
In sum, not all assertions of the form ‘p and I don’t know that p’ are 
improper. But others are indeed improper.  Moore remarks that it is ‘absurd’ to  
 
‘… assert “Dogs bark, but I don’t know that they do” … because by 
asserting p positively you imply, though you don’t assert, that you know 
that p’ (1962, 277).  
 
But the absurdity here derives not from the knowledge rule but from the 
fact that it is common knowledge that dogs bark, with the result that ‘I don’t 
know that they do’, sounds transparently insincere and thus inappropriate. A 
better example not involving common knowledge is that of a chemistry teacher 
who teaching her pupils facts about elements, tells them ‘Lithium is an alkali 
metal’. She is informing her pupils, in other words letting them know, that this 
is so and the point of her assertion is to transmit her knowledge to them. If she 
now adds in the same breath ‘but I don’t know that lithium is an alkali metal’, 
then her conjunctive assertion is ‘absurd’. 
The same is true of non-verbal assertions. Suppose that you ask me whether 
the trains are running and I respond by nodding my head in emphatic 
affirmation while holding up my thumb as a kind of semiotic exclamation mark. 
I have asserted that the trains are still running. Suppose also that you know me 
well enough to recognize that I behave in this way only when I take myself to 
know what I am affirming. Then you will see that I am trying to let you know 
that the trains are still running. If instead I respond with the same behaviour 
while telling you ‘No, they aren’t still running’ then my assertion is likewise 
improper. 
In contrast, consider a modification of Wittgenstein’s (1980, §§ 486–487) 
example with ‘know’ in place of ‘believe’, namely that of a railway official who 
                                                                                                                                        
need reason for knowledge of God’s existence and the existence of God is an article of 
faith. 
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under duress, as you know, announces ‘The train will arrive at 5 pm’ and then 
adds the aside to you ‘but personally, I don’t know that’. You hear no absurdity. 
In contrast again, suppose that instead of asking me ‘Will it rain?’ you ask 
me ‘Do you think it will rain?’ and I reply ‘It will rain but I don’t believe that it 
will’. My assertion is absurd. This is Moore’s omissive paradox, so-called 
because I assert my specific omission of true belief.15  We will return to this in 
section 10. 
How should we explain the fact that some assertions of the form ‘p but I 
don’t know that p’ are proper while others are not? The short answer is that 
when asserting is informing, then the knowledge rule does apply and it is a 
genuine criticism of one’s would-be informant that she does not know what she 
has told one. I will elaborate on this in section 10.  
In the section after next I will propose an analysis of assertion. This requires 
an analysis of expressing belief, conviction or knowledge, to which I now turn. 
 
 
8. Expressing Belief, Conviction or Knowledge 
 
I will use ‘express’ as both factive and intentional. It is factive in the sense 
that where N is noun phrase such as ‘belief’, ‘knowledge’, ‘fear’, or ‘interest’, 
then one expresses N only if one has N. It is intentional in the sense that one 
expresses N only if one does so deliberately. This usage of ‘express’ is true to its 
Latin root ‘press out’, as in ‘She expressed milk from her breast’ or ‘He 
expressed the oil of the hop’. One cannot express milk from one’s breast unless 
one has milk in one’s breast. Nor may one express oil from the hop unless one 
presses the hop deliberately.  
‘Manifest’ is also factive. One manifests N only if one has it. Expressing N 
involves ostensibly manifesting it. The converse need not hold, either because 
                                                          
15 Moore’s own example is ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I 
did’ (1942, 543) which may be formalized as ‘p and I don’t believe that p’. Elsewhere he 
gives a second example, ‘I believe that he has gone out, but he has not’ (1944, 204) 
which may be formalized as ‘p and I believe that not-p’. This may be called the 
‘commissive’ form because I assert my specific mistake in belief. Roy Sorensen (1988) 
coins these useful labels although I was the first to draw attention to this difference 
between the forms, which stems from that between atheists and agnostics (Williams 
1979). 
  Assertion and Its Many Norms  63 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 40, n. 4, pp. 39-76, out.-dez. 2017. 
one does not have N, or because one has not manifested it deliberately. As the 
first of these two cases, suppose that you ask me for the umpteenth time if I 
would like to see your holiday snapshots again. I reply untruthfully ‘I’d love to 
see them again’. I have no interest in seeing your snapshots. I have not 
manifested interest but have only ostensibly done so. Thus I have not 
expressed interest but have only purported to do so. As the second kind of 
case, suppose that as a plane takes off I involuntarily begin to sweat profusely, 
grip my arm-rest until my knuckles are white and adopt a look of terror. I am in 
fact frightened, but I think that no one is observing me and I do not wish to 
call attention to myself. I have manifested my fear (and ipso facto have 
ostensibly manifested it as well) but I have not expressed it, because I have not 
manifested it deliberately. If unbeknownst to me, you are observing me, I have 
afforded you a reason to think that I am frightened, but I have not offered you 
a reason to think so. In other words, I have not intentionally afforded you a 
reason to think that I am frightened.     
Applying this account of expression to belief, expressing a belief likewise 
involves ostensibly manifesting it, but not always conversely. Knowing that you 
are watching me, I might carry an umbrella in order to deceive you into 
thinking mistakenly that I believe that it will rain. I have not manifested a belief 
that it will rain but have only done so ostensibly. So I have not expressed this 
belief but have only purported to do so. As the case in which I do have the 
belief, suppose that I believe that my son will return from Brunei tomorrow. 
Repeatedly muttering in my sleep ‘He’ll be back from Brunei tomorrow’ might 
afford you reason to think that I believe that he will return from Brunei 
tomorrow. If I have then belief then I have manifested it. But I have not 
manifested it to you deliberately, so I have not expressed it to you.  In contrast, 
if you contradict my forecast of rain, I may express my belief that it will rain by 
defiantly shaking my umbrella in your face, because then I intentionally afford 
you a reason, in other words offer you one, to think that I believe that it will 
rain. If I am sincere then I have manifested my belief that it will rain, otherwise 
I have only ostensibly manifested it.  
This account of expressing belief coheres with the more general idea that 
one purports to express a propositional attitude to someone just in case one 
offers her reason to think that one has that attitude. For example, as we take off 
in a plane I might purport to express fear to you by telling you ‘I am afraid that 
we will crash’. If my assertion is sincere and I really do have that fear, then I 
have expressed my fear. Or I might silently pat my heart while displaying to you 
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a facial expression of terror. If my performance is insincere, then I have not 
expressed fear but have only purported to express it.  
 
In the light of all this, Expressing Belief is plausible:  
 
One purports to express to one’s actual or potential interlocutors a belief 
that p just in case one offers them reason to think that one believes that 
p. 
 
Accordingly, one expresses a belief just in case one purports to express a 
belief that one really does express, and so has that belief. The converse does 
not hold. My offer of a reason to think that I believe what I assert is defeasible, 
because you may have grounds for thinking that I am insincere. We will see 
shortly the need for the qualification ‘or potential interlocutors’.  
Turning to verbal expressions of belief, a prime way to purport to express a 
belief is to assert its content, since in making an assertion I present it as 
evidence that I believe what I have asserted, and so offer you a reason to think 
that I believe this. This is because there must be a general presumption of 
sincerity, or else the practice of insincerity could not succeed, since 
practitioners of deception present themselves as sincere. Thus when I make an 
assertion to you it is practically rational of you to assume that I am sincere 
unless observation suggests otherwise.  
A clue to how one might express knowledge may be gleaned by revisiting 
Moore’s remark that ‘by asserting p positively you imply, though you don’t 
assert, that you know that p’ (1962, 277, my italics). Moore nowhere elucidates 
this sense of ‘positively assert’ but he might mean something like ‘emphatically 
assert’. Thus if you ask me whether the trains are still running and I nod my 
head in emphatic affirmation while holding up my thumb, this counts as an 
emphatic assertion. So does my insistent ‘The trains are still running!’ said to 
you as I fix you with a steely look and bang my fist on the table. Here the 
verbal or counterpart of the exclamation mark plays an important role, as it did 
in Blauuw’s example ‘I am very lazy!’  
In ordinary life ones interlocutors take this kind of emphatic behaviour to 
be ones ostensible signal of ones degree of conviction, or psychological 
certainty, that one’s assertion is true. When we ostensibly signal a very high 
degree of conviction, those around us tend naturally to take us to know what 
we assert. When we ostensibly signal a lesser degree of conviction, those 
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around us tend naturally to take us to be convinced of what we assert. If we are 
sincere, and this is what we have on offer, then we will have expressed 
conviction. This suggests the following.  
 
E1 If one asserts that p, then one purports to express belief or 
conviction that p 
 
In other cases such as the teacher who tells her pupils that lithium is an 
alkali metal, it seems to be the context that makes the assertion express 
knowledge. This is that the pupils know that the teacher is supposed to 
know what she tells them. This suggests the following, 
 
E2 If one asserts that p in the right way or in the right circumstances, 
then one purports to express knowledge that p. 
 
E1 is consistent with E2. And so are their consequents. 
 
Of course emphatic assertors, as well as the chemistry teacher, may not in 
fact have the conviction or knowledge that they purport to express. So 
modelling the expression of knowledge upon that of belief gives us Expressing 
Conviction or Knowledge:  
 
One purports to express to one’s actual or potential interlocutors, 
conviction or knowledge that p, just in case one offers them reason to 
think that one is convinced or knows that p. 
  
Accordingly, one expresses conviction or knowledge just in case one 
purports to express conviction or knowledge that one really does express, and 
so has that conviction or knowledge, although not always conversely. 
A second and more direct way to express belief, conviction or knowledge 
via assertion is to assert that one has the belief, conviction or knowledge. In 
other words I may purport to express to you belief, conviction or knowledge 
that p by telling you that I believe, am convinced or know that p. We have 
already seen that in making an assertion I offer you a defeasible reason to think 
that I am sincere. In normal circumstances we should both recognize that I am 
the best authority on what mental states I have. So in offering you a defeasible 
reason to think that am I sincere in asserting that I have belief, conviction or 
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knowledge, I am in effect offering you a reason to think that I indeed have it. 
Thus if you ask me if it is raining I may express my belief, conviction or 
knowledge that it is, by simply answering ‘I believe so’, ‘I’m convinced that it is’ 
or ‘I know that it is’.16 This suggests  
 
E3 If one asserts that one believes, is convinced, or knows that p, then 
one purports to express belief, conviction or knowledge that p. 
 
Since a reason to think that one knows that p is a reason to think that one 
believes that p, it follows that if one expresses or purports to express 
knowledge then one expresses or purports to express belief, although not 
always conversely.  
 
 
9. An Analysis of Assertion 
 
I now propose an Analysis of Assertion:  
 
One asserts that p to one’s actual or potential interlocutors, just in 
case one purports to express belief, conviction or knowledge that p 
to them with the intention of changing their beliefs or knowledge 
in a relevant way. 
 
On this analysis, non-reflexive intention is doubly involved in assertion, first 
in expressing belief, conviction or knowledge, and then in the overall aim of the 
assertion.  
The mention of purported expression accommodates lies, which are surely 
genuine assertions. Non-verbal assertions are also accommodated, because 
shaking my umbrella in your face offers you reason to think that I believe that it 
will rain.  
 The analysis explains why muttering in my sleep ‘He’ll be back from 
Brunei tomorrow’ is not an assertion. I have not deliberately offered you a 
                                                          
16 Rosenthal (1995, 199) argues against the conclusion of this simple argument. In 
(Williams 2013, 1125–1126) I give reasons why his argument fails. 
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reason to think that I believe that he will return from Brunei tomorrow, so I 
have not expressed a belief that he will.  
The analysis also explains why you hear no impropriety in the railway 
announcement. Since you know that she is under orders, in uttering ‘The train 
will arrive at 5 pm’ she does not offer you reason to think that she believes that 
it will arrive at 5 pm. So she has not asserted that it will. In addition it explains 
why the official who utters ‘I now pronounce you man and wife’ makes no 
assertion, because it is positively bizarre to think that in so doing he is offering 
the couple a reason to think that he believes or knows that he is marrying them. 
In contrast, my utterance ‘I promise to be punctual’ counts as an assertion as 
well as a performative, since I aim to convince you that that I will be punctual 
by expressing my conviction or knowledge that I will indeed be punctual.  
The analysis also accommodates the idea that in making an assertion one is 
thereby committed in some sense to its content. In asserting that p, one offers 
one’s interlocutor reason to think that one assents to the proposition p. When 
one asserts that p so as to purport to express conviction that p, then one’s 
commitment deepens because then one offers her reason to think that one is 
confident that one possesses the truth that p. When one asserts that p so as to 
purport to express knowledge that p, then one’s commitment deepens again, 
because then one offers her reason to think that one is indeed in possession of 
the truth that p. 
The change in the beliefs or knowledge that one intends to bring about is 
‘relevant’ in the sense that the proposition that one asserts forms the core of 
the description of that intended change. We may describe this intended change 
as informing, as in teaching or confessing, reporting belief or conviction, as in 
proclaiming one’s faith, reporting knowledge, as in answering an examiner, instilling 
disbelief, perhaps eristically, and as instilling false belief, as in lying. What type of 
assertion one makes is therefore partly determined by one’s overall intention 
and success in making that type of assertion is success in fulfilling it. One’s 
interlocutor may not always know the epistemic intention of one’s assertion, 
especially when asserting is lying, but usually the context of assertion will make 
this clear to her.  
  For example, in informing or teaching you that lithium is an alkali metal, I 
intend to impart to you my knowledge that it is. In confessing to you that I 
spilled coffee I intend to let you know that I know that I spilled it, thus 
admitting guilt.  
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It is worth noting that on this account, one may transmit knowledge to 
someone without informing her (or equivalently, without letting her know). I 
might inform someone that the trains are still running without noticing that you 
are nearby. Overhearing my assertion, and knowing that I am a reliable testifier 
on such matters, you also come to know that the trains are still running. My 
knowledge has spread to you, but I have not informed you that the trains are 
still running—or equivalently, not let you know that this is so. I did not offer 
you reason to think that believe or know that the trains are still running. I made 
no assertion to you.  
Another type of assertion is opining, in other words, giving one’s opinion. 
Suppose that you ask me ‘Do you think it will rain soon?’ and I answer ‘Yes’. 
My intention is to let you know that I believe that it will rain soon. We might 
say that I have made the qualified assertion that it will rain soon. Or I might 
proclaim my faith in God by telling you ‘God exists. My faith in that is 
unshakable’.   
In a case in which I am asked by an examiner what the capital of Thailand 
is, it is practically wise of me to presume that she knows the answer. In 
answering ‘Bangkok’ my aim should not be to inform her that the capital of 
Thailand is Bangkok, but to inform her that I know that it is.  
Next consider eristic assertion. Suppose that I share your belief, conviction 
or knowledge that heroin is addictive and I know that you will not easily change 
your mind. Nonetheless I tell you that heroin is not addictive. My larger aim is, 
as some British folk might say colloquially, to ‘wind you up’ or ‘rattle your cage’ 
by making you think mistakenly that we are divided in belief.  
In lying to you that p I intend to make you mistakenly believe that p. For 
example, you ask me the time and looking at my watch I see that it is 3 pm. I 
tell you ‘It is 2 pm’ with the intention of making you believe that it is 2 pm.17 
                                                          
17 Let us call this the strong sense of ‘lie’. Moore objects to this definition saying that 
 
... it is not clearly self-contradictory to say: ‘‘What he said happened to be true, but 
nevertheless he was lying when he said it, for he fully believed it to be false and yet 
wished to persuade others that it was true’’’(1962, 381). 
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 At the time of asserting, the aim of the assertor is to succeed in fulfilling 
these various intentions. But fulfilling them need not always be practically 
rational, if success conflicts with other demands of practical rationality. To 
adapt a previous case, I might successfully inform someone that he has made a 
silly mistake, but fail in my larger attempt to thereby compliment him. It might 
be practically unwise of me to inform you that the drunk sitting next to us is 
likely to react violently when called a drunk if I can see that he is listening 
intently to our conversation and I wish to avoid altercation. These 
complications are beyond the scope of my paper.   
The clause ‘or of a potential audience’ is needed to accommodate cases such 
as the following. Suppose that I am brought before a judge who happens to 
know me very well. Under oath I tell her ‘I live on Carter Street’. I know that 
she already knows that I live on Carter Street and also knows that I am sincere. 
So I need have no intention to change her knowledge or beliefs in any way via 
my assertion. But a central point of testimony under oath is to put it public 
record so that any interested party may witness it. My intention is surely that 
such a person will believe that I live on Carter Street or at least will think that I 
believe it. Likewise if I flourish a billboard proclaiming ‘The end of the world is 
at hand’, that counts as an assertion even in an empty street, because I intend to 
change the epistemic cognition of anyone who might notice. 
What of cases in which I appear to make assertions to myself? Suppose that 
knowing that I tend to leave my hard drive in my office, I say repeatedly to 
myself aloud as I am getting ready to leave, ‘I must take my drive. I must take 
my drive’. Surely I am not offering myself a reason to think that I believe or know 
the contents of what I am saying. However it is not clear that my utterances do 
really count as assertions. It seems plausible that I am repeatedly depicting an 
assertion to an imaginary interlocutor—perhaps my alter ego—as a theatrical way 
of reminding myself that I must take my drive.    
 
                                                                                                                                        
This fits the sense of ‘lie’ in which I lie to you that p just in case I assert that p to you 
with the intention of deceiving you into mistakenly believing that p. If unbeknownst to 
me, my watch is an hour fast with the result that my assertion is true, then Moore 
would still count this as a lie. Let us call this the weak sense of ‘lie’, since it is included 
by, but does not include, the strong sense. In either sense I am insincere in my assertion 
because I cannot aim to make you mistakenly believe that p via my assertion that p unless 
I myself believe that not-p. 
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10.  Explaining the Propriety or Impropriety of Assertions 
 
This analysis of assertion helps to explain the propriety or impropriety of 
assertions we have discussed. I will deal with them in the order that they have 
appeared.  
 
In telling you ‘He is, I believe, a keen cyclist’ or ‘He is, I know, a keen 
cyclist’ I may properly express to you, via E3, my belief or knowledge 
that he is a keen cyclist in order to instil it in you.  
 
Next consider my reply to your question whether the trains are running, 
 
‘They are running. But don’t quote me, I don’t know it for a fact’. 
 
I have admitted that I do not know the answer and so have avoided the 
deepest commitment to the truth of my assertion of the first conjunct. This 
makes my ‘But don’t quote me’ appropriate. By asserting my first conjunct, I 
have expressed, via E1, my belief that the trains are running in order to instil 
that belief in you. So I have embraced the shallowest commitment to the truth 
of my assertion of the first conjunct. This retreat in commitment is appropriate 
given that getting you to accept my opinion is the best next option available to 
me to transmitting knowledge.  
Next is the case in which I respond to your fear that the molecules of 
oxygen in our room will suddenly congregate in one corner with  
 
‘That won’t happen’. 
 
E3 allows me to express my conviction to you that your fear will be 
unrealized. This conforms to the point of my assertion, which is to give 
you as much reassurance as is appropriate by transmitting my conviction 
in your safety to you. 
 
 Next consider my confession 
 
 ‘I am, I know, very lazy!’  
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By E3 I properly let you know that I know that I am very lazy by expressing 
my knowledge that I am. In contrast, consider my response to your accusation 
that I spilled coffee,  
 
‘Hmm … I did, I think, spill it’.  
 
This is not enough to amount to a confession, but is properly enough to 
satisfy you in admitting only that I think I am guilty by expressing my belief, via 
E3, that I spilled the coffee.  
Next, consider the case in which I respond to your advice to not hope too 
much from my lottery ticket, with  
‘My ticket won’t win. I’m convinced of that. But still, one never knows’.  
My response is appropriate because I express my belief that my ticket will 
lose via E1 by asserting my first conjunct and then reinforce this by expressing 
my conviction of this via E3 by asserting my second conjunct. The point of this 
is to convey to you my pessimism that I temper with a degree of optimism that 
I assert in my third conjunct.  
In telling you ‘It will rain soon, but I don’t know that it will’, I remind you 
that, by my epistemological lights, I do not know that it will rain, which makes 
my expression of belief that it will rain (via E1 by asserting my first conjunct) 
appropriate in the face of this reminder. I tell you this with the intention of 
getting you to accept my prediction on the strength of my justified conviction.  
 
Next consider the case in which I tell my patriarch  
 
‘God exists. My faith in that is unshakable, but of course the existence of 
God isn’t the sort of thing one may know’.  
 
In asserting my first conjunct I express, via E1, my belief in the existence of 
God, which I reinforce, via E3, by asserting my second. This is appropriately 
conjoined with my assertion of the third conjunct, by which I express, via E1, 
my belief that the existence of God is unknowable. The point of my whole 
assertion is to proclaim what I know is a central feature of my faith.  
In contrast, my assertion ‘Lithium is an alkali metal but I don’t know that it 
is’ said to you as a teacher or when I assert its first conjunct emphatically, is 
inappropriate. This is because in asserting my first conjunct, I purport to 
express to you, via E1, my knowledge that lithium is an alkali metal, yet I tell 
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you in the same breath that I do not have the knowledge I purport to express. 
If you believe what I tell you then you have reason to think that I do not have 
the knowledge that I purport to transmit to you. So the point of my assertion, 
which is precisely to effect this transmission, must fail. Since I am in a position 
to see this, on my charitable presumption that you are epistemically rational, it 
is practically irrational of me to make the conjunctive assertion.  
In comparison, consider the case in which I tell my psychiatrist  
‘I still believe that people are following me, although I still have no reason 
to think so’.  
By asserting my first conjunct I express to her, via E1, my belief, and then 
tell her that I have no reason for it, which lets her know that I still have it 
irrationally. Doing so is appropriate because it is part of my practically rational 
attempt to obtain epistemic damage control. 
Finally, consider the case of Moore’s omissive paradox in which you ask me 
‘Do you think it will rain?’ and I reply ‘It will rain but I don’t believe that it will’. 
By asserting my first conjunct I purportedly express my belief, via E1, that it is 
raining, yet I have also told you that I do not believe that it is raining. My reply 
is improper because I have purportedly-asserted-and-expressed a contradiction. 
This remains so even if my assertion is insincere, which explains why you still 
hear absurdity even after you learn that I am lying.  
 
 
11.  Types of Assertion and Their Norms 
 
As we have seen, one way in which an assertion may be improper is that 
making it frustrates its point. Another way in which it may be improper, which 
may or may not coincide with the first way, is that one makes it as a type of 
assertion while failing to be in the epistemic state needed for it to be of that 
type. In this sense, the norm of a type of assertion is the epistemic state one needs for one’s 
speech-act to succeed in being an assertion of that type.  The epistemic state in question 
is determined by the point of the type of assertion.   
We may describe this intended change as informing, or specifically, teaching 
or confessing, reporting belief or conviction, as in opining or proclaiming one’s faith, 
reporting knowledge, as in answering an examiner, instilling disbelief, perhaps 
eristically, and as instilling false belief, as in lying.   
For example, when my assertion to you that p counts as letting you know 
that p, I myself know that p. So in intending to let you know (or equivalently, 
  Assertion and Its Many Norms  73 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 40, n. 4, pp. 39-76, out.-dez. 2017. 
inform you), I must know the content of my assertion. This is the norm of 
informing. Here the knowledge account gets things right. It is a genuine 
criticism of one’s would-be informant that she does not know what she has 
told one, for she is practically irrational in trying to do what she should see will 
not succeed, namely transmit to one knowledge that she does not possess. The 
same goes for reporting knowledge. I cannot let my examiner know that I know 
the answer unless I really do know it. It is a genuine criticism of one’s examinee 
that she does not know the answer. Here too the knowledge account gets 
things right.  
Next consider opining, in other words giving one’s opinion. You ask me 
‘Do you think it will rain?’ and I answer ‘Yes’. Given that this counts as my 
qualified assertion that it will rain, you will not find it improper, even if you 
know that I do not know that it is raining. After all, I have appropriately given 
you what you have asked for, which is not my knowledge of the weather but 
only my opinion. But if instead, I answer ‘Yes but I don’t believe that it will’, 
then you hear absurdity. I cannot succeed in giving you my opinion that it will 
rain unless I believe that it will. So in intending to opine, I must believe the 
content of my assertion, otherwise I am practically irrational. This is the norm 
of opining. Here the knowledge account gets things wrong.  
Next consider eristic assertion. In asserting to one’s interlocutor that p, one 
cannot sensibly or appropriately aim to ‘wind her up’ by making her think 
mistakenly that one disagrees with her in her belief that not-p unless one believes 
that she believes that not-p. This is the norm of eristic assertion. But this does 
not mean that one knows that p. So here again the knowledge account gets 
things wrong. 
Lastly, consider lying. The point of one’s lie is to make one’s interlocutor 
mistakenly believe that its content is true. One attempts to do so by purporting 
to express belief or knowledge of the content of the lie, in other words by 
offering her defeasible reason to think that one believes or knows its content. 
Purporting to express knowledge of it, for example by telling the lie 
emphatically, is more likely to result in the success of the lie than purporting to 
express belief in its content. This is because if she comes to think that one 
knows, rather just believes, its content, then she has more reason to believe it as 
well. But of course this does not mean that the norm of lying is that one 
believes or knows its content. Its norm is rather that one believes that its 
content is false. For however one tells a lie that p, one cannot aim to make 
one’s interlocutor mistakenly believe that p via one’s assertion that p unless one 
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believes that not-p. To appreciate this point, suppose you enlist my rational 
cooperation in getting me to lie to someone that it is 2 pm. I tell her ‘It is 2 pm’ 
and then whisper to you the aside ‘but I don’t believe that it is not 2 pm’. You 
will find this improper, because you will recognize that if my aside is sincere 
then I have failed to tell a lie. At best I would have made my assertion on the 
basis of a guess. From your perspective, in whispering the aside I have broken a 
rule of lying. You might say that I have ‘cheated’. Here again the knowledge 
account gets things wrong. 
 
 
12. Concluding Remarks 
 
I submit that my account of norms of assertion coheres well with the idea 
that assertions are akin to types of game with different rules and with the 
indisputable fact that there are types of bona fide assertion other than informing. 
It clearly locates the source of criticism arising from violating a norm of a given 
type of assertion as a form of practical irrationality and it provides a plausible 
analysis of the speech-act of assertion, one that explains the propriety or 
otherwise of assertions. 
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